We consider a game theoretic approach for sequentially choosing decisions by combining the suggestions of a fixed number of experts.
1
The Setup
The space of possible decisions, D, and the space of possible outcomes,~, are both assumed to be compact subsets of Euclidean space. We sequentially interact with the system for a total of T units of time, where T must be finite and known in advance. If we choose the J sequence of decisions @ = (dl, d2, . . . . dT G DT and we observe the sequence of system states y c YT, then our cumulative performance at time T is T @T =~+(dt,yt) t=l where~: D x Y~R is called the payoff function which must be continuous. We make the assumption that the decision made does not influence the system we are observing. This assumption holds under a variety of *This material was partially based upon work supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship.
lThis assumption corresponds to being able to view each unit of time as playing a two-player zero-sum game with imperfect information (i.e. where each player chooses their decision simultaneously).
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t=l
We wish to sequentially choose our distributions on D to perform nearly as well as the best expert, no matter who turns out to be the best expert in the end. We take a game theoretic viewpoint and minimize the net loss, v = mW@~,T -&J' i uniformly over all possible outcome sequences yT and all possible experts. Specifically, we hypothesize the existence of an opponent whose goal is to maximize the net loss. The choice of expert opinions and the choice of system states are viewed as "moves" by this hostile opponent.
The value of v when both players play optimally is called the value of the game.
Applications
By choosing V, Y, and @ appropriately, we can find several applications that are special cases of this setup. 
This is the problem of predicting a discrete signal one time unit in advance using squared error loss.
Gambling
on a finite alphabet. D={(d~,..., dm):dt~o,~jdj=l} Y={l, +.., m}
This is the problem of gambling on a sequence of letters drawn from a finite alphabet.
Our decision at each time corresponds to what fraction of our wealth we place on each letter, and the wealth we receive is given at fair odds. Thus, the amount of money placed on the correct letter increases by a factor of m, while money placed on incorrect letters is lost. We measure payoff by log-wealth since logwealth is additive and has a good interpretation as the wealth growth rate.
The solution to this problem is given in [2] . (1) S=t+l where xa,t = @,,, -@, is the amount by which the ith expert is beating us at time t. Note that V* only depends on the past history of the game through the set of differences, {zi)t }~1.
The function V* plays a central role in the theory because the value of the game (our worst case net loss) is V* (O; ON), and furthermore, our optimal distribution at time t is given in terms of V* as PD; = arg~$mv:x(V*(t; ) w)]) (2) Note that this distribution is simply the optimal mixed strategy for the minimizing player in a two-player, zerosum game whose payoff matrix is
Thus, by using methods from the theory of games, it is possible to calculate this optimal distribution very efficiently if we can calculate }(y, d) easily for any given arguments.
Examples of such methods for finite games include the simplex algorithm and the Shapley-Snow methods (see [6] ). In certain special cases (like the examples considered in section 6) it is possible to give a simple procedure for obtaining the optimal distribution from the function~(y, d), (or equivalently, from V*).
Unfortunately, only in rare circumstances does there exist a nice closed form for V*. Whenever V and Y are finite, it turns out to be possible to calculate V* exactly in polynomial time using a dynamic programming argument (as shown in [3]), but the degree of the polynomial grows with AI', ID I, and IYl so that this method is not usually practical.
Let us therefore suppose that we cannot calculate V* exactly but are able to obtain an approximation, V, by some easily computable method. We might then consider choosing our distributions to satisfy the following condition.
This method is the obvious choice because it coincides with the optimal strategy, (ss given by (2)), when V equals V*. As before, calculating the distribution Pb:
that satisfies this condition is straightforward if the function V can be easily calculated for any set of arguments.
The bssic result is given by the following theorem. If we use a "pessimistic" approximation to the value function, then the actual value of the net loss when using a strategy based on this approximation is never worse than our pessimistic approximation for the value of the game. Such a function is called an overvalue function.
Definition:
A function, V : {0,1,..., T} x IRN -+ IR,, is called an overwdue function if it satisfies the following two conditions,
for all XN G IRN.
The value function V* satisfies these conditions with equality, which is why we refer to functions that satisfy (i) and (ii) Thus, given any overvalue function V, we immediately have a bound on the worst case net loss when using the
algorithm.
Finding
Overvalue Functions
The Overvalue Theorem shows that any overvalue function will yield a strategy with provably good performance, and furthermore, the best performance will be achieved by the overvalue function that overestimates V* by as little as possible. (Ideally, we should use V* itself.) Since every overvalue function must overestimate V*, a good way to look for overvalue functions is to take the expression for V* given in (1) , find the tightest possible upper bound for each set of arguments, and hope that these bounds satisfy the overvalue conditions. In practice, this method works quite well, and any method for overestimating V* will typically yield an overvalue function.
To upper bound V*, we find it useful to make the following two definitions. Using these two definitions, it is possible to write down an explicit formula for an overvalue function that will turn out to be very useful. At first glance, this theorem looks intimidating because of the seemingly complex conditions required on C and A, and because of the complex looking overvalue function, VA, that we obtain.
We will find, however, that the conditions on C and A are not difficult to verify in practice, and the resulting overvalue function VA can be computed very efficiently.
We will now elaborate on each of these issues.
We begin by considering the problem of finding a complete class C. From the definition, it is clear that we could always take C to be the set of all possible distributions on~, but this set is usually much larger than is necessary, and it is desirable to have C be as small as possible in order to yield the tightest performance bounds.
We will define a set C to be minimally complet e if we cannot remove any distributions from C and still have a complete class. We will usually only be interested in classes of distributions that are minimally complete.
When Y is finite, the notion of completeness greatly simplifies because of the following result, This is a much simpler condition than given in the definition of completeness because it removes the dependence on the arbitrary function g. For each subset Y. of Y, a distribution satisfying the condition in the theorem k obtained by finding a solution to the two-player, zero-sum game with payoff matrix @(d, y) when the minimizing player's class of decisions is restricted to Y.. As before, this can be done using any of various methods including the simplex algorithm and the Shapley-Snow method. Since Y haa only finitely many subsets, the theorem shows that C can always be taken to be finite, and it also gives a method for finding C; we simply solve this equation for each subset of Y and include the solution in C. A minimally complete class can than be obtained from C by throwing out any unnecessary distributions, we see that our performance bound will be smallest when VA is aa small as possible. This turns out to be equivalent to choosing the random variable A* whose U graph is as low as possible subject to the constraint (4). Thus, we should choose A* so that U [a; A*] equals the convex hull of the graphs of U [a; X(e, Y)]. It is then clear that A* will satisfy (4) in the tightest possible fashion, i.e., the graph of U [a; A*] will lie below that of U [a; A] for every other A that satisfies (4). In general, A* will depend on the particular choice of complete class C.
Definition:
The random variable A* that satisfies (4) in the tightest possible fashion for a given set C is called the mintmal dilation associated with C.
As mentioned previously, a sufficient condition to guarantee that A" exist is that the payoff function,~, be bounded. Also, because of (6) 
i i
Thus to calculate VA, we first determine /3 and k that satisfy (8), and then calculate VA from (7). In general, these steps can both be accomplished very quickly, the exact amount of computation depending on the distribution A. For the examples given in the next section, both of these steps can be accomplished in time O(T-t). This amount of time is quite reasonable and suggests that the D* ( VA. ) algorithm offers an acceptable computational procedure for determining our distribution at each time.
If computation
time is critically important, we might also consider other distributions satisfying (4). While these distributions won't yield performance as good as A*, they may be easier to use in the sense that the complexity of si,t will not grow as much with T. Since si,t is obtained by adding independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) copies of A, an obvious choice for A would be a normal random variable because then Si,t would also be normal.
When~is bounded, we can always find a normal distribution that satisfies (4), in which case VA can be calculated in constant time (independent of T). The performance degradation that results from using the normal random variable rather than A* is typically small (eg. the worst case net loss increases by no more than a factor of @ for the examples in section 6).
We conclude this section by displaying some distributions that satisfy (4) for any bounded payoff function. The scaled Bernoulli random variable yields the better performance, but the normal random variable results in an overvalue function that is slightly easier to calculate. Thus, without any further work, we have found an A that works for any sequential decision problem posed in section 1 that has bounded payoff. The D* (VA) algorithm yields a computationally feasible method with provably good performance VA (O; ON).
Typically, the optimal A* for a given problem will yield a net loss that is only a small factor better than the net loss achieved using either of the distributions given in theorem 4.
5
Performance Considerations
Having found a reasonable method for computing our distribution at each time, we might wonder how the performance behaves as a function of T and N, and also how this performance compares to the best possible performance that can be achieved. This section addresses these questions. Thus, in the limit of large T, the bound VA(O; ON) on the net loss is proportional to~. This performance is quite good since we expect the performance of the best expert to grow linearly with T. Furthermore, in the limit of large N, the proportionality constant is approximately VA~~which grows only minimally with N, How does this performance compare to the best possible performance achievable? Under quite general conditions, it can be shown that V* (O; ON) must grow at least as quickly as fl (fl) for any N, and the proportionality constant must grow like Q(m) in the limit of large N. To prove this fact, we generalize a method proposed in [1] . Specifically, we consider experts that always suggest a degenerate distribution on D, i.e. one that places all of its probability y on a single decision in 'D, where the particular decision suggested is chosen at random according to some dist ribut ion, PD. , The dist ribut ion PD. that we use depends on the payoff function~, and must be non-degenerate (i.e. not place all of its probability on a single decision). This method will only fail if the payoff function @(d, y) , when viewed aa a two-player, zero-sum game, has an optimal pure strategy d* for the maximizing player. Further details and extensions can be found in [3] . We now find the distribution A* that corresponds to the set C* given in this corollary.
To obtain A*, we first plot U [a; X(e, Y)] for each Py c C* and each e E D. The m = 4 case is shown in figure 1 where we have only plotted those curves that are positive at some point. In figure 2 . Finally, we can read off the distribution of A* from its graph using a simple property of the U operator, namely P{A* = a} = ,Ceb{u : -$ U[ti; A*] = a} &=u Thus, the probability that A* takes on the value a is simply the amount of time that the slope of U [a; A*] equals a. Using this fact, we easily obtain the distribution of A* as given in the following theorem. From theorem 5, we conclude that on a sequence of length T, we make about uA. I/m more mistakes than the best of IV experts. This is negligible since we expect the number of errors for the best expert to be proportional to T. In the special case m = 2, we find that uA* = 1/2 which agrees with the result given in [1] . For any given values of T and iV, the value of VjI. will typically be slightly better than the bound found in [1] , but the difference will be negligible when iV and T are both very large. Also note that a~. grows only minimally with m, which results in the net loss increasing by no more than about 8% as m --i co.
Having found A*, we can also obtain other distributions satisfying (4). For example, each of the following distributions satisfies (4) for every m, For the prediction problem, the optimal prediction can be computed by a "reverse water-filling" method. We begin by making a bar graph where w~include a "bar" having width one and height VA (t; {@~,t (/-1, Y)}~l) for each y E Y. This is shown in figure 3 for the m = 4 case. We reverse water-fill on this bar graph (gravity y=l y=2
Shaded area equals amount of probability to allocate to each y y=3
L
In this case, we allocate no probability to y=% y=4
Figure 3: Obtaining our distribution by reverse waterfilting. goes upward) with total water one. The amount of "water" that goes into each bar is precisely the amount of probability the distribution Pb: will allocate to that value of y. Ph.D. 
